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Abstract
There are two methods for estimating the earnings disadvantage of groups: the residual differ-
ence method and the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. Each method infers disadvantage from 
differences in earnings of visible minority immigrants and other Canadians, after controls 
for human capital and job characteristics. We: i) summarize the logic of these methods; ii) 
critically examine the character of the experience measures used in most of the research; iii) 
apply the residual difference method to the Workplace and Employee Survey to show how a 
more thorough approach to the measurement of work experience modifies estimates of earn-
ings disadvantage.
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Résumé
Deux méthodes sont utilisées pour estimer le désavantage salarial de groupes : la ‘méthode de 
difference résiduelle’ et la ‘décomposition Oaxaca-Blinder’. Selon la logique de ces méthodes, 
après avoir contrôlé pour les différences du capital humain, le désavantage des immigrants de 
minorités visibles relatifs aux autres Canadiens est la différence nette du salaire. Dans cette 
article nous : i) décrivons la logique de ces méthodes ; ii) examinons la qualité des indicateurs 
d’expérience utilisés ; iii) analysons les données de l’Enquête sur le milieu du travail et les 
employés. Notre conclusion est que le fait d’inclure d’indicateurs améliorés de l’expérience a 
pour effet de modifier l’estimation du désavantage.
Mots-clés: salaries, experience, immigrants de minorities visiblesYoko Yoshida and Michael R. Smith
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There is a large body of Canadian research on the relative earnings of members of 
visible minority groups and of immigrants. Two procedures are used to generate es-
timates of earnings disadvantage. Sociologists and some economists use a residual 
difference method. It involves the introduction into a regression equation of one or 
more dummy variables identifying a disadvantaged group along with measures of 
human capital and other relevant controls. If, after adding controls, there is a sig-
nificant effect of the dummy variable on earnings, that effect is treated as a measure 
of disadvantage. While not all papers are explicit on this, “disadvantage” is often 
viewed as an indicator of discrimination. Economists more typically use an Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition technique in which separate equations are estimated for the 
groups thought to be advantaged and disadvantaged, the coefficients estimated for 
one group are subtracted from those estimated for the other group and if, say, the 
effect of human capital on earnings is larger for one group than for the other, the dif-
ference estimated provides the measure of disadvantage or discrimination. 
Each technique has its strengths and weaknesses. Nonetheless, their fundamen-
tal logic is the same. 
Accept that productivity varies with a set of standard indicators of human cap- 1. 
ital: education, experience, and language skills. 
In the case of the residual difference method, put the indicators into an equation  2. 
along with a dummy or dummies for the (hypothetically) disadvantaged group 
or groups. Or, in the case of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, put the human 
capital indicators into two or more equations, one for each group of interest. 
Assign to discrimination any visible minority immigrant earnings disadvantage  3. 
after controls for human capital using either of the two methods. This discrimin-
ation could take place in access to jobs, or within jobs, or both. Conversely, the 
absence of differences in earnings after controls for human capital would indi-
cate the absence of discrimination. 
If the disadvantage disappears after the addition of controls for job characteris- 4. 
tics, infer that there is discrimination in access to jobs, but not within jobs. 
If, after controls for job characteristics, the disadvantage persists, infer the exist- 5. 
ence of discrimination both within jobs and in access to them.
This logic, then, can either lead to the conclusion that discrimination is present 
or not present. Examples in Canadian research of the use of these methods to esti-
mate the earnings disadvantage of visible minority immigrants are de Silva (1992, 
1997), Li (2000, 2001), Reitz (2001), Hum and Simpson (1999), Pendakur and Pen-
dakur (1998, 2002), Wanner (1998), Swidinsky and Swidinsky (2002), and Adamuti-
Trache and Sweet (2005).
Key findings from this research are that visible minority immigrant males earn 
less than native-born white males but visible minority females do not earn less than Measuring and Mismeasuring Discrimination against Visible Minority Immigrants
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native-born white females. Immigrant whites of both genders tend to earn the most.1 
Another key finding is that the disadvantage of native-born visible minority mem-
bers is complicated. Pendakur and Pendakur (2002) report consistent disadvantage 
across five censuses for males. They also show that there are wide variations in the 
situations of different groups. For example, their analysis reveals that while black 
males were disadvantaged in all censuses, which was not the case for other groups. 
Japanese-Canadians were advantaged in four out of five census years and not dis-
advantaged in the fifth and earliest census. Chinese-born were disadvantaged in three 
censuses, advantaged in one, and neither advantaged nor disadvantaged in the re-
maining census. Using the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics (SLID) Hum 
and Simpson (1999:392) found that “with the exception of Black men, there is no 
significant wage gap between visible minority and non-visible minority members for 
native-born workers.” 
Much of the disadvantage of visible minority immigrant males originates in 
lower returns to experience and education than those of other population categor-
ies. The premium to their overseas experience is approximately zero. The premium 
to a diploma received overseas is lower than the premium received for a Canadian 
diploma. Note, however, that the visible minority immigrant disadvantage in returns 
to education disappears when their education is completed in Canada. Controlling 
for kinds of job reduces the difference between the earnings of visible minority im-
migrant males and their white counterparts (whether native-born or immigrant), but 
some studies find that a difference persists. The bulk of the evidence, then, is consist-
ent with a discrimination interpretation.
In the detailed analyses in this paper we confine our attention to visible minority 
immigrant males. Because other studies find little or no disadvantage and because 
our own analysis of the data set that we use finds no disadvantage we do not model 
the pay-determination of women. Nonetheless, to establish comparability with other 
studies and to illustrate our broader point on the bias introduced into disadvantage 
estimates by the measurement of experience commonly used in the research, women 
are included in our first two tables. Our other exclusion from the detailed analyses is 
native-born visible minority members because there are not enough of them in our 
sample.
The Problem of Measurement
The bulk of the relevant Canadian research that estimates the quantity of the earn-
ings disadvantage of visible minority immigrants uses census data. These are data of 
a very high quality indeed. Moreover, even with public use samples, the number of 
1.  The standard interpretation is that since women, whether white or visible minority, immigrant or 
native-born, are poorly paid there is less room for earnings disadvantage. This may be correct. But it 
has not yet been subject to careful empirical scrutiny.Yoko Yoshida and Michael R. Smith
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cases to work with is large — for example, about 350,000 in Reitz’s (2001) use of the 
1996 census. Nonetheless, we would argue that, despite its quality and the size of the 
sample it makes available, the census is a particularly poor source if the intention is 
to estimate magnitudes of discrimination. This is because the census lacks a measure 
of experience. 
There is no question on work experience in the census information so schooling 
duration is used to construct what Reitz (2001:357) calls “the usual derived meas-
ure” — in fact, the “Mincer proxy”: age minus 5 or 6 (depending on the age at which 
schooling is assumed to start), minus years of education. This is, usually, a potential 
maximum number of years of experience. It assumes that individuals are continu-
ously employed after their schooling ends.2 In the literature on gender earnings dis-
advantage it has been recognized that this is a biased measure. Many more women 
than men withdraw from employment to raise children so it clearly overestimates 
mean years of female employment by more than it overestimates male years of em-
ployment. Some effort has been made to correct the bias in the census (e.g., Kidd and 
Shannon, 1997). Drolet (2002) emphasizes the value of a more adequate experience 
measure in her analysis using the WES. That this is also likely to be a problem when 
comparing immigrants to the native-born is less widely recognized.
The Mincer proxy is used in an attempt to measure cumulative work experience. 
Hum and Simpson (2004) produce a markedly improved analysis by including a 
much better measure of the same concept. But the problems with measures of ex-
perience go beyond the inadequacy of the Mincer proxy. Work experience would be 
expected to increase pay because it increases individual productivity. The cumulative 
number of years of work on its own, however, is likely to be a misleading indicator 
of the amount of productivity-enhancing work experience. There are also the effects 
on experience of changes of employer and job. 
Many of these will no doubt involve a cumulative process in which the skills 
demanded at each new employer or job build on what was learned at the previous 
employer or job. In such cases, cumulative years of experience would be a good indi-
cator of an employee’s capacity to be productive. But we know that there is a great 
deal of turbulence in employment. Job creation and destruction are pervasive in cap-
italist economies, including Canada (Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996; Baldwin, 
Dunne, and Haltiwanger, 1998). Greater trade exposure appears to have increased 
both (Klein, Schuh, and Triest, 2003). Where someone shifts between employers 
and jobs because part or all of their workplace ceases operation, by definition, the 
specific skills that added to their productivity become irrelevant. Moreover, if that 
person is compelled to switch industries — which is likely to be the case where job 
loss was trade-initiated — previously acquired skills that were general within the in-
itial industry of employment may become irrelevant too. Total years of employment 
2.  Employment during schooling means that in some cases the Mincer proxy underestimates total ex-
perience. It is clear, however, that the aggregate effect of this measure is to produce an overesti-
mate.Measuring and Mismeasuring Discrimination against Visible Minority Immigrants
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— cumulative experience — certainly overstates the real, productivity-enhancing, 
work experience of some proportion of employees. Our guess is that the proportion 
is quite large.
The final problem with measures of experience is that they assume that all jobs 
provide the same opportunities for skill enhancement. Even if correctly measured, 
cumulative years of experience treats the learning through experience of a lawyer as 
equivalent to that of a short-order cook. This is surely implausible. Some significant 
part of the labour force moves through jobs that demand little of them and involve 
negligible consecutive skill development.
Part of what is at issue here is access to training. Whether on-the-job, in class-
rooms at work, or in courses taken outside work, whether specific or general, training 
amounts will vary between jobs (e.g., Duncan and Hoffman, 1979:596–598; Barron, 
Berger, and Black, 1997). In most professions, skill upgrading is continuous through 
an entire employment history, or through most of it. To generalize the characteristics 
of professional employment to the rest of the labour force would be imprudent. But 
that is precisely what a measure of experience based only on cumulative years of em-
ployment does. So, when controls for occupation and industry are added to an equa-
tion they will to some degree tap a training effect. Professionals with twenty years 
of work experience in the financial services industry or parts of the education sector 
probably earn more than other respondents with similar experience in part because 
on-the-job and other training forms have been a continuous element of their employ-
ment history.3 This has implications for the interpretation of ethnicity coefficients in 
equations that control for industry and occupation.
The general point made in this section is the following: most of the relevant re-
search uses the census; the use of the census to estimate the magnitude of discrimina-
tion using either the residual difference method or an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition 
requires unbiased measures of human capital; but the census probably does not pro-
vide an unbiased measure of cumulative work experience. Nor does cumulative work 
experience exhaust what is likely to be productivity-relevant in someone’s employ-
ment history. Heckman (2004:104) has made a similar point about the measurement 
limitations of research on discrimination, with some force.
Reconsidering the Earnings of Visible Minority  
Immigrants
Consider, in more detail, the biases introduced by the reliance on the Mincer proxy to 
estimate visible minority immigrant earnings disadvantage. Insofar as immigration 
involves transitional periods of prolonged job search — and that is surely the case 
3.  The effect of employer-provided training is not, however, straightforward. Whether employer-pro-
vided training is associated with higher pay — and at what point in the employee’s career — is likely 
to be influenced by whether the training provides specific or general skills. The classic statement of 
this issue is Becker (1975). In this analysis we set aside this complexity.Yoko Yoshida and Michael R. Smith
CSP 2008, 35.2: 311–338  316
for many family-class or asylum-seeking migrants — it is likely to systematically 
overestimate the cumulative work experience of visible minority immigrants as com-
pared to both native-born Canadians and white immigrants (since the latter are less 
likely to fall into the family-class or refugee categories).4 So-called “economic class” 
migrants, who ought to have less difficulty integrating into the labour market, were 
already exceeded by family-class immigrants and refugees by the end of the 1970s 
(Reitz, 1998:78). The share of economic-class migrants has since risen — but is still 
exceeded by the other immigrant categories if family-class immigrants, spouses and 
dependents of economic-class migrants, and refugees are summed.5 All this is to say 
that the proportion of immigrants for whom the transition to employment is likely 
to be prolonged and difficult is significant. As far as we can tell, in most of the Can-
adian research using the census to explore differences in earnings by ethnicity and 
immigrant status, the implications of problems of the Mincer proxy go unconsidered. 
A recent paper by Hum and Simpson (2004:131–132) makes precisely this point and, 
using the Survey of Labour and Income Dynamics, shows that the earnings disadvan-
tage of immigrant men is reduced where a direct measure of experience is used rather 
than the Mincy proxy. 
Even with an adequate measure of cumulative years of work experience there 
are other problems. The specific skills of immigrant adults are lost when they ar-
rive in Canada. Since their move is to a richer country with (for the most part) more 
sophisticated capital equipment, the value of skills that were general and therefore 
transferable across employers and equipment in their country of origin is reduced. 
Some of those skills are likely to be, effectively, specific to their previous employ-
ment and of no value in Canada. We know, as a matter of fact, that a significant 
proportion of adult visible minority immigrants with work experience when they 
arrived in Canada not only switch employers but also switch occupations (Boyd and 
Thomas, 2002; Renaud and Cayn, 2006).
Suppose, however, that an immigrant arrives as an adult and moves promptly 
into a job that exploits skills acquired in the country of origin. There still may be a 
problem. Training will normally be offered in one of the official languages. Offers of 
productivity-enhancing training are likely to be delayed until the employee acquires 
the required language skills. In fact, of course, language difficulties are likely to 
channel many immigrants into jobs that provide little opportunity for training. Adult 
immigrants are, indeed, less likely to receive training (Hum and Simpson, 2003, 
2004; Yoshida and Smith, 2005).6
4.  Wanner (2003) shows differences in labour market outcomes across immigrant classes.
5.  The totals for 2001 can be found at http://www.statcan.ca/english/freepub/89-611-XIE/tables/
suptableb.htm
6.  Hum and Simpson reject the hypothesis that language is an obstacle to immigrant training (2003:486–
487). We think that they do so prematurely. They rest their conclusion on responses to a question that 
asks the reason for not taking training. Few adult immigrants cited language. They said that training 
was “not offered,” “inconvenient,” that they were “too busy” or that training was “too expensive.” 
The last category is beside the point. Employer-provided training would not require employee pay-Measuring and Mismeasuring Discrimination against Visible Minority Immigrants
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The use of the census and the Mincer proxy means that the application of either 
the residual difference method or of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition probably 
overestimates the earnings disadvantage of visible minority immigrants because it 
overestimates their cumulative work experience. The earnings disadvantage is likely 
to be overestimated because, on average, the difference between the maximum and 
the actual years of employment is larger for visible minority immigrants than for the 
native-born. The effect of this would be to misleadingly reduce the estimated rate of 
return to cumulative experience for visible minority immigrants relative to that of the 
native-born. There may be further sources of error where analyses fail to recognize 
that much work experience acquired in the country of origin is likely to have no value 
in Canada, and that language deficiencies are a barrier to training — pushing immi-
grants in their first years in Canada away from jobs for which productivity-enhancing 
training is a prerequisite. For all these reasons, in what follows we focus on the role 
of experience in the earnings determination of immigrants and the native-born.
A Different Data Set
We analyze data from Statistics Canada’s Workplace and Employee Survey (WES). 
The WES has two distinctive characteristics. It involves interviews with both man-
agers and a sample of employees within the workplaces managed, and panel data is 
generated on both workplaces and employees. The research on earnings differentials 
by ethnicity and immigrant status cited earlier is, however, entirely cross-sectional. 
Since our objective is to examine the premises of that research we confine our an-
alysis in this paper to the first, 1999, cross-section.7 That survey generated 5440 
employer responses and 24,938 employee responses.8
For our purposes, the WES has two advantages over alternative data sets. First, 
it has better measures of experience. The employee survey has this question: “Con-
sidering all the jobs you have held, how many years of full-time working experience 
do you have?” Imperfect recollection will have caused measurement error. Still, the 
question invites respondents to sum working experience across jobs. Those who have 
been out of the labour force for ten years while child rearing, or for two years while 
ment. More importantly, these responses probably reflect the character of immigrants’ jobs. It is 
likely that training was not offered, was offered inconveniently, or that work schedules did not allow 
training because immigrants were in jobs whose employers had little interest in upgrading employee 
productivity through training. Note also that Yoshida and Smith report that the pay-off to training for 
employed visible minority immigrants was as large as that for native-born whites.
7.  We have also performed exploratory analyses on the 2000 survey. Not surprisingly, the results seem 
similar.
8.  Details of the survey can be found in Guide to the Analysis of the Workplace and Employee Survey 
1999, Business and Labour Market Analysis Division and Labour Statistics Division, Statistics Can-
ada. When the employer and employee responses are linked, the usable N’s are reduced by the exist-
ence of workplaces for which no employee responses exist and employees for whom no workplace 
responses exist.Yoko Yoshida and Michael R. Smith
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receiving language training and job-hunting after immigration, are likely to have 
adjusted their responses accordingly. Respondents were also asked when they started 
working with their current employer and when they started working in their current 
job. There are, then, good measures of cumulative work experience, of experience 
with the current employer, and experience at the current job.
The  WES  experience  measure  may  also  be  superior  to  the  measure  avail-
able from SLID, used by Hum and Simpson (2004). That measure, oddly, treats 6 
months of work in a given year as a full year of employment. (See the relevant sec-
tion of the SLID data dictionary at http://www.statcan.ca/english/SLID/t05200.
htm#yrgt6m11.) The SLID  measure systematically overestimates the number of 
years of work experience for the seasonally employed. The WES experience ques-
tion is less likely to have that weakness. 
Unlike the census and SLID, the WES also contains direct questions on employ-
er-provided training. Those questions yield three measures that we use: on-the-job 
training; whether the respondent received classroom training; and, if he or she did, 
how many separate courses were taken. Training, we argue, is an attribute of work 
experience that is pertinent in pay determination. Responses on training received 
may provide us with more precise information on the quality of the work experience 
than would knowledge of the broad occupation of the respondent alone.
The second advantage of the WES is that it provides better data on employer 
characteristics than either the census or the SLID. Managers are usually better in-
formed on the characteristics of the output of the workplace (that determines its as-
signment to one or another industry), on company size, on the aggregate investment 
in training by the firm, and on other employment or job characteristics likely to be 
associated with pay. The WES allows us to more effectively control for industry and 
for firm characteristics.
Despite these two major advantages, we do not claim that the WES allows an ac-
curate estimate of pay discrimination against visible minority immigrants — or, for 
that matter, a categorical argument that such discrimination does or does not exist. 
We discuss data set limitations later in the paper.
Measures, Sample Selection, and Model Specification
Our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the hourly wage rate. In research 
using the census the usual dependent variable is total annual earnings. That total may 
be produced by substantially different numbers of hours worked (Christofides and 
Swidinsky, 1994:35). Even within a sample confined to full-time, full-year employ-
ees, annual earnings will vary with both basic hours worked (because each threshold 
specifies a minimum, above which there is considerable variation) and with over-
time. Two people with the same total pay may have different wage rates. Having to 
work longer for the same total pay would constitute disadvantage. Consequently, Measuring and Mismeasuring Discrimination against Visible Minority Immigrants
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as in other research using a data set containing a measure of it, we focus on hourly 
pay. Our main independent variable of interest is summarized in visible minority/im-
migration status dummies. To simplify presentation, in what follows we call this the 
IVOI — independent variable of interest.
We exclude female employees from the detailed analyses because, as noted ear-
lier, visible minority immigrant women do not earn less than the native-born. Among 
males our analysis is applied to two samples: full-time (32 or more hours per week), 
full-year (52 weeks of work in the survey year) employees; and all effective labour 
market participants, which we define as employees who earned $1,000 or more in 
the reference year, no matter how many hours or weeks they worked. We include 
a separate analysis of full-time, full-year employees because we assume that this 
indicates a strong commitment to labour market participation. In the analyses of ef-
fective labour market participants that include controls for industry, occupation, and 
firm characteristics we include controls for hours worked and weeks worked. Part-
time, part-year jobs are likely to be systematically different from full-year, full-time 
jobs in ways unlikely to be fully captured by industry-related controls. Except for 
our first descriptive table we also exclude visible minority native-born Canadians; 
there are not enough of them in our sample for useful analysis. And, because of their 
distinct economic position, we exclude Aboriginals. 
Descriptive information on the independent variables used in the analysis is pro-
vided in the Appendix Table. All except three are drawn directly from questions in 
the WES survey. The exceptions are the Mincer proxy, language skills, and location 
of education. The Mincer proxy was constructed as described above, using estimates 
of years of education associated with different levels of certification drawn from 
Ferrer and Riddell (2002). The indicator of language skills was constructed from 
two questions: one on the language used at work and the other on the language used 
at home. Where the two coincide we assume that the employee is likely to be more 
skilled in the language required in the workplace. The place of education indicator is 
a dummy variable constructed using the age of immigration variable. Those arriving 
after the age at which their schooling level would normally be completed are as-
sumed to have a foreign education. Those arriving after the minimum age of school-
ing but before the age at which their level of schooling would normally be completed 
are assumed to have a mixed education. Other respondents are assumed to have been 
educated in Canada (see Li, 2001).
Finally, there is the question of how to go about specifying a wage equation, 
given the variables that we use. With a large number of variables the precise causal 
sequence is always an issue. For example, almost all studies of wage determination 
include occupation and industry as control variables, along with human capital. But 
people are hired into occupations and industries on the basis of employer perceptions 
of their human capital. The causal sequence would then be: human capital leads to 
occupation and industry of employment which leads to pay. Occupation and industry 
of employment, in that case, are partly endogenous with respect to human capital, Yoko Yoshida and Michael R. Smith
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rather than simultaneous determinants of earnings. To capture that endogeneity one 
can imagine a more complicated modelling strategy — one that has not usually been 
adopted by researchers in this area.
Along similar lines, consider the effect of training. Training increases skills. 
Within pretty much any model of labour market functioning greater skills imply 
higher pay, sooner or later. However, it is clear that training is often directed to more 
skilled employees, who already earn more than others. There is strong evidence of 
this in the research on technological change. It shows that new equipment is assigned 
to the more skilled, so that much of the pay advantage of those using it reflects the 
fact that they were paid more initially rather than that their pay increased when they 
were assigned to, and trained to use, new equipment (Doms, Dunne, and Troske, 
1997:277; Chennells and Van Reenan, 1997:596; Entorf and Kramarz, 1997:1503; 
DiNardo and Pischke, 1997).
One might conclude from this that a modelling strategy should be adopted that 
allows for endogeneity of wages with respect to training. That is not the approach 
we adopt for two reasons. First, we seek to specify our models in a way that makes 
them as similar as possible to most of those found in the existing research on the sub-
ject — that is, as reduced form equations. Second, as will be seen in our substantive 
discussions, we interpret our results as evidence of the characteristics of the kinds of 
jobs in which different IVOI categories find themselves.
Finally, the analyses presented here use the residual difference method rather 
than the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique. There are advantages and dis-
advantages to both techniques (e.g., Rummery, 1992 versus Coleman, 2003). For 
the purposes of this paper the advantage of the residual difference method is that the 
effect of consecutive controls for different measures of experience shows up clearly 
in changes in the size of the visible minority immigrant group dummy.9
Analysis
Average Differences
Table 1 presents the mean differences in hourly earnings in both raw and logged 
form, by IVOI. To establish the comparability of our results with those of selected 
other researchers this table includes both women and native-born visible minority 
members. The broad pattern of mean differences is as follows. Within the sample of 
full-time, full-year employees, native-born white males earn about $1.50 per hour 
more than visible minority immigrants in the full-time, full-year sample; immigrant 
white males earn the most — almost $2.00 per hour more than native-born whites; 
and native-born visible minority members earn the least — $2.25 per hour less than 
visible minority immigrants. The wage rate differences are somewhat larger in the 
9.  We have rerun the analysis using the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition technique. The estimates of 
changes in the earnings disadvantage as a result of controls for experience are approximately the 
same using each method. Those results can be sent on request.Measuring and Mismeasuring Discrimination against Visible Minority Immigrants
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Table 1. Mean Earnings by IVOI and Sex
Full-time, Full-year Employees All Employees
Males
Native-
born 
white
Native-
born 
visible 
minority
Immi-
grant 
white
Immigrant 
visible 
minority
Native-
born  
white
Native-
born visible 
minority
Immi-
grant 
white
Immigrant 
visible 
minority
Hourly Wages Hourly Wages
Mean 21.17 17.24 22.94 19.53 Mean 20.86 15.84 22.42 18.84
P-value, 
mean dif-
ference
(refer-
ence) 0.008 0.015 0.028
P-value, 
mean dif-
ference
(refer-
ence) 0.000 0.012 0.002
ln Hourly Wages ln Hourly Wages
Mean 2.93 2.70 3.01 2.85 Mean 2.90 2.60 2.99 2.80
P-value, 
mean dif-
ference
(refer-
ence) 0.026 0.012 0.035
P-value, 
mean dif-
ference
(refer-
ence) 0.000 0.001 0.005
N 9141 150 1107 668 10916 195 1275 769
Females
Native-
born  
white
Native-
born 
visible 
minority
Immi-
grant 
white
Immigrant 
visible 
minority
Native-
born 
white 
Native-
born visible 
minority
Immi-
grant 
white
Immigrant 
visible 
minority
Hourly Wages Hourly Wages
Mean 16.51 16.81 18.22 16.74 Mean 16.37 15.81 18.23 15.76
P-value for 
the mean 
difference
(refer-
ence) 0.797 0.023 0.757
P-value, 
mean dif-
ference
(refer-
ence) 0.655 0.005 0.336
ln Hourly Wages ln Hourly Wages
Mean 2.70 2.73 2.79 2.69 Mean 2.66 2.63 2.78 2.63
P-value, 
mean dif-
ference
(refer-
ence) 0.583 0.006 0.791
P-value, 
mean dif-
ference
(refer-
ence) 0.534 0.000 0.390
N 5866 102 650 584 8158 153 899 694
broader, effective labour market participant, sample. The gaps between native-born 
whites and visible minority immigrants rises to a bit more than $2.00 and between 
the two male visible minority categories to about $3.00 per hour. The bottom half of 
the table shows that as compared to native-born whites visible minority women are 
not disadvantaged in either sample.
The overall pattern revealed in Table 1, it should be clear, is not an eccentric out-
come of the WES data set. Our rankings of male earnings by IVOI coincide perfectly 
with those of  Li (2000) and only differ from those of Pendakur and Pendakur (1998) 
in that, like Li, we find that immigrant visible minority men earn more than native-
born visible minority men while Pendakur and Pendakur find the reverse. Our data 
reveal, then, a difference in earnings across the male IVOI categories that requires 
explanation. The difference is similar to that reported in comparable studies.10 Not 
10.  Divergent results might be explained by any or all of the following differences between the studies. 
i) The data were collected at different times from 1991 to 1999. ii) Pendakur and Pendakur, and Li 
exclude the Atlantic provinces, whose earnings are low and whose visible minority population is 
relatively small. (For confidentiality reasons, the public use sample of the Census withholds Atlantic Yoko Yoshida and Michael R. Smith
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surprisingly, given the narrower earnings differences between categories of women, 
their rankings move around more between studies. The earnings advantage of white 
immigrant women is consistent across studies. 
In Table 2 we take a first stab at detecting bias produced by the inadequate work 
experience measures available from the census. Across the IVOI categories the table 
compares the means of the three WES experience measures, and the Mincer proxy. 
Again, in this table we include native-born visible minority members because they 
feature in other studies and there are enough of them to make possible a straight-
forward comparison of means.
Consider, first, the differences between the measures of cumulative work experi-
ence among males. The Mincer proxy overestimates the average experience of all 
relevant categories. But the overestimates are largest for visible minority immigrants. 
For the full-year, full-time sample the overestimate for white native men, for example, 
is about a year and a half on an average of 18 and a half years, for white immigrants 
about two years on an average of almost 22 years, and for native-born visible minority 
members a bit more than a year and a half on an average of about 19 years. For visible 
minority immigrants it is over five years on 16 years average experience. The average 
years of experience for the broader sample are consistently lower than for the full-
year, full-time sample, but the differences are similar, except for visible minority im-
migrants for whom the overestimate of experience is even larger in the full sample.11
Not surprisingly, the biasing effect of the Mincer proxy among women is even 
clearer. It overestimates the cumulative work experience of visible minority immi-
grants by about six and a half years relative to average work experience of about 14 
years. Interestingly, the magnitude of the overestimate is almost as large for white 
immigrant women.
We can reasonably conclude that all studies using the Mincer proxy substantially 
overestimate visible minority work experience, relative to the much smaller overesti-
mate of the work experience of native-born whites. Table 2 also shows that visible 
minority immigrants have less experience than their white counterparts on all three 
WES experience measures.
Canada identifiers for ethnic minorities.) This would tend to bias upwards the estimated difference in 
earnings between visible minority members and whites. iii) There are some differences in the com-
position of the IVOI categories in the Census and in WES. iv) Li included the self-employed which 
we and Pendakur and Pendakur do not. v) Our dependent variable is hourly earnings; that of the other 
two studies is total earnings. vi) Pendakur and Pendakur confine their analysis to those between 20 
and 64. We and Li do not impose an age restriction on our sample. vii) Our analysis rather precisely 
measures the hourly rate of pay while the other two studies appear to include both full-time and part-
time employees. They attempt to make comparable the earnings of employees with different numbers 
of hours worked by adding a full-time/part-time dummy. viii) For confidentiality reasons the earnings 
reported by the census are truncated. This is not so for the WES data.
11.  The only striking difference between the samples is that the average years of experience for visible-
minority natives is much lower in the full sample than in the full-year, full-time sample. This is 
presumably related to the fact that many of the native-born are second generation immigrants and are 
therefore likely to be younger.Measuring and Mismeasuring Discrimination against Visible Minority Immigrants
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The Base Model
Table 3 contains two additive models — in each case with two specifications: one 
includes the classroom training variable, the other the (related) number of courses 
measure. Both include the IVOI dummies, with native-born white as the default cat-
egory. The p-values (two-tail test) reported were generated from standard errors es-
timated using bootstrap weights provided by Statistics Canada. Model 1 contains the 
standard set of human capital variables, including cumulative experience. Model 2 
adds to those a whole set of controls, including the location of education. The models 
are estimated for both the full-year, full-time and all-employee samples. The results 
in the table are mainly consistent with those of previous research.
Model 1, with human capital controls, shows for both samples that visible min-
ority immigrants earn significantly less than native-born or immigrant whites. The 
disadvantage is larger for the all-employee sample than for the full-year, full-time 
sample. Earnings increase with education and experience, with the quadratic term 
Table 2. Mean Years of Experience: Different Measures
Full-Year, Full-Time All employees
Entire Sample
Cumulative 
experience
Cumulative 
experience
WES
Mincer 
proxy
Employer 
duration
Job 
duration
N WES
Mincer 
proxy 
Employer 
duration
Job 
duration
N
All 17.46 20.39 9.31 6.64 18268 16.23 19.80 8.79 6.46 23059
White 
Native 17.30 19.82 9.37 6.60 15007 16.13 19.34 8.88 6.47 19074
Vis Min 
Native 16.35 17.58 6.60 4.59 252 11.44 12.52 5.18 4.04 348
White Imm 20.42 24.35 10.34 7.61 1757 19.31 24.21 9.73 7.26 2174
Vis Min Imm 15.41 21.33 7.81 6.03 1252 14.26 20.40 7.43 5.82 1463
Males
All 18.65 20.66 9.80 7.11 11066 18.02 20.19 9.48 7.02 13155
White 
Native 18.48 20.15 9.97 7.14 9141 17.97 19.80 9.71 7.12 10916
Vis Min 
Native 19.35 20.96 5.82 4.86 150 13.81 14.76 5.04 4.44 195
White Imm 21.62 23.80 10.38 7.70 1107 21.14 23.74 9.99 7.46 1275
Vis Min Imm 16.09 21.42 7.86 6.30 668 15.20 20.75 7.43 6.00 769
Females
All 16.11 20.09 8.76 6.10 7202 14.59 19.44 8.15 5.95 9904
White
Native 15.96 19.44 8.69 5.99 5866 14.46 18.93 8.12 5.89 8158
Vis Min 
Native 13.31 14.18 7.38 4.31 102 9.12 10.32 5.32 3.65 153
White Imm 18.94 25.02 10.29 7.50 650 17.51 24.67 9.48 7.06 899
Vis Min Imm 14.70 21.23 7.76 5.75 584 13.41 20.08 7.43 5.65 694Yoko Yoshida and Michael R. Smith
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Table 3. The Log Hourly Wage Rate: Additive, Males*
Full-Time, Full Year Employees
        Model 1 Model 2
Classroom training Number of 
courses Classroom training Number of 
courses
N 10916 10916 9935 9935
R2 0.2267 0.2189 0.4273 0.4276
Coeff.  P-value Coeff.  P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff.  P-value
Intercept 2.3426 0.000 2.3626 0.000 1.9878 0.000 1.9920 0.000
VisMinImm -0.0838 0.026 -0.0879 0.022 -0.0014 0.974 -0.0001 0.999
WhiteImm 0.0337 0.324 0.0342 0.296 0.0402 0.227 0.0423 0.194
Less than high school -0.1366 0.000 -0.1423 0.000 -0.1096 0.000 -0.1103 0.000
College, etc. 0.0556 0.051 0.0619 0.028 0.0120 0.617 0.0126 0.600
University plus 0.3814 0.000 0.3949 0.000 0.1566 0.000 0.1578 0.000
Experience (WES exp) 0.0357 0.000 0.0360 0.000 0.0211 0.000 0.0211 0.000
Experience sq. -0.0006 0.000 -0.0006 0.000 -0.0003 0.000 -0.0003 0.000
Language 0.0427 0.155 0.0493 0.098 0.0265 0.311 0.0277 0.291
OJT 0.0068 0.783 0.0051 0.840 -0.0347 0.079 -0.0370 0.060
Classroom training 0.1422 0.000 N/A 0.0376 0.029 N/A
Number of courses N/A 0.0261 0.000 N/A 0.0102 0.081
Mixed education -0.0216 0.661 -0.0230 0.637
Foreign education -0.1090 0.011 -0.1121 0.008
Hours per week N/A N/A
Weeks per year N/A N/A
Forestry, mining, oil, and gas 
extraction 0.3811 0.000 0.3826 0.000
Labour intensive tertiary manu-
facturing 0.0846 0.072 0.0829 0.078
Primary product manufacturing 0.2776 0.000 0.2775 0.000
Secondary product manufac-
turing 0.2423 0.000 0.2407 0.000
Capital intensive tertiary manu-
facturing 0.2913 0.000 0.2913 0.000
Construction 0.3634 0.000 0.3626 0.000
Transportation, warehousing, 
wholesale 0.2236 0.000 0.2262 0.000
Communication and other 
utilities 0.2960 0.000 0.2967 0.000
Information and cultural 
industries 0.2621 0.000 0.2635 0.000
Finance and insurance 0.2826 0.000 0.2849 0.000
Real estate, rental, leasing 
operations 0.2088 0.011 0.2081 0.011
Business services 0.2655 0.000 0.2645 0.000
Education and health services 0.1437 0.003 0.1444 0.003
Small company  0.0700 0.016 0.0716 0.013
Medium company 0.1703 0.000 0.1728 0.000
Large company 0.2517 0.000 0.2548 0.000
Married  0.1403 0.000 0.1413 0.000
Common Law 0.0975 0.003 0.0966 0.003
Separated/divorced 0.0601 0.069 0.0614 0.060
Managers 0.4280 0.000 0.4274 0.000
Professionals 0.3575 0.000 0.3564 0.000Measuring and Mismeasuring Discrimination against Visible Minority Immigrants
CSP 2008, 35.2: 311–338  325
Table 3 (cont.)
Full-time, Full Year Employees (cont.)
Coeff.  P-value Coeff.  P-value Coeff.  P-value Coeff. P-value
Technical/trades 0.1484 0.000 0.1478 0.000
Sales 0.0849 0.198 0.0835 0.203
Clerical 0.0084 0.788 0.0071 0.818
Foreign owned 0.0750 0.002 0.0768 0.001
Firm: incentive pay 0.0589 0.001 0.0591 0.001
Firm: training expenses 0.0000 0.006 0.0000 0.007
Collective bargaining 0.0466 0.026 0.0455 0.031
Region: Quebec  -0.0639 0.038 -0.0642 0.037
Region: BC 0.0221 0.413 0.0214 0.426
Region: Other Provinces -0.1151 0.000 -0.1158 0.000
*P-values for two-tailed test
All Employees
        Model 1 Model 2
Classroom 
training
Number of 
courses
Classroom 
training
Number of 
courses
N 12960 12960 11859 11859
R2 0.2588 0.2521 0.4493 0.4492
Coeff.  P-value Coeff.  P-value Coeff.  P-value Coeff. P-value
Intercept 2.3379 0.000 2.3559 0.000 2.2747 0.000 2.2777 0.000
VisMinImm -0.1129 0.001 -0.1170 0.000 -0.0450 0.254 -0.0438 0.263
WhiteImm 0.0112 0.689 0.0116 0.668 0.0049 0.857 0.0069 0.795
Less than H.S. -0.1280 0.000 -0.1335 0.000 -0.1124 0.000 -0.1136 0.000
College, etc. 0.0558 0.028 0.0609 0.016 0.0046 0.834 0.0054 0.803
University plus 0.4119 0.000 0.4247 0.000 0.1675 0.000 0.1692 0.000
Experience (WES exp) 0.0379 0.000 0.0383 0.000 0.0208 0.000 0.0207 0.000
Experience sq. -0.0006 0.000 -0.0006 0.000 -0.0003 0.000 -0.0003 0.000
Language 0.0071 0.814 0.0119 0.688 0.0011 0.968 0.0021 0.944
OJT 0.0130 0.555 0.0101 0.655 -0.0282 0.114 -0.0310 0.082
Classroom training 0.1439 0.000 N/A 0.0550 0.000 N/A
Number of courses N/A 0.0283 0.000 N/A 0.0139 0.018
Mixed education N/A N/A -0.0197 0.638 -0.0214 0.610
Foreign education N/A N/A -0.0898 0.030 -0.0938 0.022
Hours per week N/A N/A -0.0052 0.000 -0.0052 0.000
Weeks per year N/A N/A -0.0006 0.610 -0.0007 0.596
Forestry, mining, oil, and gas 
extraction
0.4213 0.000 0.4236 0.000
Labour intensive tertiary manu-
facturing
0.0952 0.027 0.0937 0.030
Primary product manufacturing 0.2851 0.000 0.2855 0.000
Secondary product manufac-
turing
0.2422 0.000 0.2413 0.000
Capital intensive tertiary manu-
facturing
0.3014 0.000 0.3024 0.000
Construction 0.3938 0.000 0.3935 0.000
Transportation, warehousing, 
wholesale
0.2370 0.000 0.2416 0.000Yoko Yoshida and Michael R. Smith
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indicating the familiar reversal of the experience effect in the last years of employ-
ment. There is weak evidence that using the same language at work and home is as-
sociated with higher pay. Training in the form of employer-paid courses or classroom 
training at the workplace increase earnings. Interestingly, on-the-job training has no 
significant effect on the wage rate.
In model 2 we add controls for job and employer characteristics, and for whether 
or not education was completed outside Canada. The negative coefficient for visible 
minority immigrants falls by a lot, though by less for the all-employee sample than 
for full-year, full-time employees. Nonetheless, it becomes insignificant for both 
samples. Some of this fall is associated with the inclusion of the location of education 
variable. Those who completed their education outside the country — most of whom 
will be visible minority immigrants — get paid less as compared to those who com-
pleted it within the country. Note that, while negative, the effect of partial completion 
of an education outside Canada is insignificant (“Mixed education”).
Table 3 (cont.)
All Employees (cont.)
Coeff.  P-value Coeff.  P-value Coeff.  P-value Coeff. P-value
Communication and other 
utilities
0.2770 0.000 0.2790 0.000
Information and cultural 
industries
0.2557 0.000 0.2579 0.000
Finance and insurance 0.2980 0.000 0.3026 0.000
Real estate, rental, leasing 
operations
0.1732 0.012 0.1734 0.011
Business services 0.2345 0.000 0.2346 0.000
Education and health services 0.1222 0.006 0.1239 0.005
Small company  0.0525 0.038 0.0549 0.030
Medium company 0.1329 0.000 0.1369 0.000
Large company 0.2181 0.000 0.2223 0.000
Married  0.1585 0.000 0.1601 0.000
Common Law 0.0994 0.000 0.0987 0.000
Separated/divorced 0.1211 0.002 0.1233 0.001
Managers 0.4181 0.000 0.4190 0.000
Professionals 0.3718 0.000 0.3722 0.000
Technical/trades 0.1183 0.000 0.1189 0.000
Sales -0.0003 0.992 0.0000 1.000
Clerical -0.0172 0.617 -0.0179 0.596
Foreign owned 0.0562 0.016 0.0588 0.011
Firm: incentive pay 0.0537 0.003 0.0545 0.002
Firm: training expenses 0.0000 0.012 0.0000 0.011
Collective bargaining 0.0619 0.001 0.0607 0.001
Region: Quebec  -0.0700 0.012 -0.0703 0.012
Region: BC 0.0429 0.107 0.0421 0.112
Region: Other Provinces -0.1203 0.000 -0.1210 0.000
*P-values for two-tailed testMeasuring and Mismeasuring Discrimination against Visible Minority Immigrants
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Some of the fall in the visible minority negative coefficient is also associated 
with the controls for job and employer characteristics. The coefficients for training 
shed some light on this. The magnitudes of the coefficients for classroom training and 
number of courses fall by more than half when industry, occupation, and employer 
controls are added. Evidently, industry, occupation, and other job characteristics are 
associated with the likelihood of being trained.
Overall, our results look like those of other researchers — though with a bet-
ter experience measure the visible minority immigrant disadvantage is more fragile. 
Adjusting scores so that the three IVOI groups have equal amounts of human capital 
based on the standard sorts of measures, leaves a residual earnings disadvantage for 
visible minority immigrants. Part of this originates in the fact that overseas education 
is poorly rewarded. At the same time, training makes a difference to earnings and is 
evidently associated with occupation, industry, and other employer characteristics. 
Once these are controlled (with the better controls available in WES) the effect of vis-
ible minority immigrant status disappears. Within industries and occupations, then, 
visible minority immigrants are not disadvantaged. Their disadvantage originates in 
their differential access to jobs in industries and occupations that provide higher pay.
The Effects of Experience
Our next question is: Would our results be different had we used the Mincer proxy 
of work experience rather than the measure available in the WES? In Table 4 we 
compare relevant coefficients from equations using the two alternative measures. 
(Here and subsequently, only the equations containing the course training variable 
are included since, as we saw earlier, the course training and number of courses 
specifications produce similar results.) The results are what one would expect. The 
magnitudes of the effects of the two experience measures are about the same within 
each of the two models. But the size of the negative coefficient for the visible minor-
ity immigrant dummy is larger where the Mincer proxy is used than where the WES 
experience measure is used. In model 1, with controls for human capital, the speci-
fication within which visible minority immigrants are disadvantaged, the use of the 
Mincer proxy inflates the visible minority immigrant earnings disadvantage by about 
30% in both samples and reduces the p-value considerably. In model 2, using the 
WES cumulative experience measure, the visible minority immigrant disadvantage 
becomes insignificant. Substituting the Mincer proxy gets the disadvantage close 
to significance, particularly in the all-employee sample. It is clear that the negative 
effect on earnings of visible minority immigrant status is overestimated in studies 
using census data and a Mincer proxy of experience.
As we noted earlier, in a context of substantial job loss and job creation, the 
cumulative experience that we examine in Table 4 may not fully capture the pro-
ductivity-relevant effects of experience. There is also experience acquired working 
for a single employer and experience acquired in a particular job. In Table 5 we Yoko Yoshida and Michael R. Smith
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separately add measures of those forms of experience to the cumulative experience 
measure. Only the results for model 1 are presented. We saw earlier that introducing 
controls for industry and job into the additive model eliminated the significant earn-
ings disadvantage of visible minority immigrants. In addition, the quadratic terms 
for duration in job and with employer are insignificant. We have omitted those terms 
from the final equation.
Three initial results stand out. The first is that, when duration of employment 
with current employer is added to an equation containing cumulative experience, 
the coefficients for the two cumulative experience terms are only slightly changed. 
This is true for both samples. Second, the linear term for duration of employment 
with current employer is separately positive and significant. Third, duration in cur-
rent job also has a separate positive effect on earnings. Note, furthermore, that we 
have explored the extent of multicollinearity in the equation — beyond the relative 
stability of the cumulative experience coefficients across specifications. The variance 
inflation factors are low.12 The results in the combined cumulative experience and 
duration with employer equations seem to reflect genuine independent effects. With 
similar levels of cumulative experience, those with a longer duration with the current 
12.  In models without the quadratic terms all the variance inflation factors fall within the range of 1 to 
about 1.75. When the quadratic terms are added the factor for cumulative experience increases to a 
little over 10, while the other factors remains in the 1 to 1.75 range.
Table 4
Full-Time, Full-Year Employees
Model 1 Model 2**
WES Mincer proxy WES Mincer proxy
N 10916 10916 9935 9935
R2 0.2267 0.2057 0.4273 0.4179
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
VisMinImm -0.0838 0.026 -0.1192 0.001 -0.0014 0.974 -0.0182 0.668
WhiteImm 0.0337 0.324 0.0287 0.394 0.0402 0.227 0.0423 0.185
Experience 0.0357 0.000 0.0354 0.000 0.0211 0.000 0.0187 0.000
Experience 
squared -0.0006 0.000 -0.0006 0.000 -0.0003 0.000 -0.0003 0.000
All Employees
Model 1 Model 2**
WES Mincer proxy WES Mincer proxy
N 12960 12960 11859 11859
R2 0.2588 0.2417 0.4493 0.4411
Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value Coeff. P-value
VisMinImm -0.1129 0.001 -0.1606 0.000 -0.0450 0.254 -0.0663 0.101
WhiteImm 0.0112 0.689 0.0009 0.975 0.0049 0.857 0.0072 0.787
Experience 0.0379 0.000 0.0385 0.000 0.0208 0.000 0.0196 0.000
Experience 
squared -0.0006 0.000 -0.0006 0.000 -0.0003 0.000 -0.0003 0.000
*P-values for two-tailed test. Coefficients after controls for variables in corresponding models in Table 4.
**Additional controls, as indicated in note to Table 4Measuring and Mismeasuring Discrimination against Visible Minority Immigrants
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employer get paid more.
Another interesting result is that the addition to the equation of duration with 
current employer slightly weakens the pay disadvantage of visible minority immi-
grants in both samples — by a bit more than 10%, in fact. Generally speaking, our 
results suggest that the three forms of experience have separate effects on earnings, 
and play some role in explaining the earnings disadvantage of visible minority im-
migrants.
Table 5. Log Hourly Wage Rate with Employment and Job Duration*
Full-Time, Full-Year
Employment duration Job duration
N 10916 10916
R2 0.2457 0.2285
Coeff.  P-value  Coeff.  P-value 
Intercept 2.3213 0.000 2.3320 0.000
VisMinImm -0.0734 0.035 -0.0834 0.025
WhiteImm 0.0433 0.194 0.0353 0.296
Less than H.S. -0.1425 0.000 -0.1385 0.000
College, etc. 0.0592 0.034 0.0565 0.048
University plus 0.3879 0.000 0.3852 0.000
Experience (WES exp) 0.0315 0.000 0.0350 0.000
Experience sq. -0.0006 0.000 -0.0006 0.000
Duration  0.0091 0.000 0.0033 0.010
Language 0.0476 0.099 0.0438 0.146
OJT 0.0110 0.655 0.0103 0.675
Classroom training 0.1383 0.000 0.1441 0.000
All Employees
Employment duration Job duration
N 12960 12960
R2 0.2815 0.2648
Coeff.  P-value Coeff.  P-value
Intercept 2.3123 0.000 2.3201 0.000
VisMinImm -0.1014 0.001 -0.1113 0.001
WhiteImm 0.0218 0.418 0.0148 0.587
Less than H.S. -0.1361 0.000 -0.1318 0.000
College, etc. 0.0593 0.017 0.0568 0.026
University plus 0.4185 0.000 0.4174 0.000
Experience (WES exp) 0.0334 0.000 0.0365 0.000
Experience sq. -0.0006 0.000 -0.0006 0.000
Duration 0.0103 0.000 0.0060 0.000
Language 0.0102 0.727 0.0079 0.794
OJT 0.0185 0.398 0.0192 0.376
Classroom training 0.1387 0.000 0.1470 0.000
*P-values for two-tailed test Yoko Yoshida and Michael R. Smith
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Discussion
Analyses using the public use sample of the census can luxuriate (so to speak) in very 
large sample sizes — up to 350,000 cases for those using the 1996 version. Using the 
WES, we do not have that advantage. Still, we do have a respectable 10,000 or so 
cases. In addition, as compared to the census, we have unambiguously superior infor-
mation with respect to work experience and work characteristics. More recently, the 
SLID has been used in analyses of the earnings disadvantage of visible minority im-
migrants. There are also some advantages to the WES as compared to the SLID. The 
WES has superior information on work characteristics, its measure of work experi-
ence may be better, and it also includes information on training, a critical component 
of work experience, in our view.
With these data, across the two samples, we have shown the following.
Like other studies, our analysis of WES data indicates that visible minority  • 
men get paid less than their white counterparts — whether immigrant or native-
born.
The Mincer proxy overestimates the work experience of visible minority immi- • 
grants by more than it overestimates that of immigrant or native-born whites.
The magnitude of the estimated negative effect on earnings of visible minor- • 
ity immigrant status is increased when the Mincer proxy of experience is used 
rather than the WES measure.
Training, measured as classroom training or number of courses, is associated  • 
with higher pay.
After controlling for human capital, including training experience, visible min- • 
ority immigrants remain disadvantaged, though only modestly so.
Adding (better measured) controls for industry, occupation, and job removes  • 
the earnings disadvantage of visible minority immigrants entirely. Doing so also 
reduces the training effect on pay.
Different kinds of experience — cumulative, duration with employer, and dur- • 
ation in job — have separate effects on pay and modify the relation between 
visible minority immigrant status and pay.
What is to be made of all this?
First, and most fundamentally, we have shown that poor measurement of work 
experience leads to an overestimate of visible minority immigrant earnings disadvan-
tage. This is not just a question of the dependence on the Mincer proxy in the bulk 
of the research — though that is certainly important. More generally, research using 
either the residual difference or the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method, the logic 
of which require careful measurement of human capital, has settled for an unsuit-
ably simplified model of the relation between work experience and productivity. 
Cumulative work experience, even if properly measured, does not deal with the fact 
that employer- and job-specific skills will often be lost when an immigrant changes Measuring and Mismeasuring Discrimination against Visible Minority Immigrants
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countries and jobs; nor does it take into account the connection between employer-
provided training and productivity and the fact that language difficulties are likely to 
reduce the incidence of training among immigrants.
Second, remember that the effect of training on earnings in model 1 was reduced 
when industry and related measures were added in model 2. This suggests that the 
separation of human capital from other effects, a separation that is crucial to the logic 
of the methods we consider here, is problematic. Occupation, industry, and other em-
ployer traits are treated as separate and distinct from human capital. But employers 
vary in the extent to which they provide training. Unless there is a direct measure of 
training incidence — of the sort available in the data set used here — it is likely that 
differences in the amount of human capital acquired through training are likely to be 
embedded in the industry and related controls.
We would push this point a little further. Our measures of training only tell us 
about what happened to the respondents in the previous year. We do not have evi-
dence on cumulative training, which is unlikely to fully coincide with cumulative 
experience. Both a short-order cook and, say, a patent agent may have twenty years 
of cumulative work experience, possibly with the same employer. We would argue 
that they are very unlikely to have received equivalent amounts of employer-provided 
training. Our analysis probably underestimates the effect of training on earnings. It 
is possible that the visible minority immigrant coefficient would be modified by bet-
ter cumulative training information. Our guess is that it is more likely to reduce the 
negative effect of visible minority immigrant status than to increase it. But that is a 
matter for further research.
This leads to the next point. There is no perfect data set, and this is true of the 
one we have used here. We would underline four of its weaknesses. First, we do not 
have a complete set of pertinent measures of education. We know from Ferrer and 
Riddell (2002) that, in addition to level of education, field of study makes a differ-
ence to earnings. Second, there is no measure of field of study in the WES. Nor do we 
have a measure of community size. But earnings are related to community size and 
immigrants are concentrated in large communities, so our estimate of their earnings 
disadvantage is biased downwards. Third, in this analysis we have treated visible 
minority immigrant status as a homogeneous category. As discussed earlier, we know 
from the analysis of census data by Pendakur and Pendakur (2002) that there have 
been substantial differences in the earnings of native-born visible minority members 
with different ethnic origins. It is likely that there are similar differences among the 
foreign born. Our sample size, however, is not sufficiently large to allow an explora-
tion of that. Finally, as noted earlier, the smaller sample size of the WES means that 
coefficients that would be significant with the census may be insignificant with the 
WES.
However, in addition to the problem with the measurement of experience em-
phasized throughout this paper there are further problems with the previous research 
reviewed earlier. Despite the fact that the census provides information on field of Yoko Yoshida and Michael R. Smith
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study, none of the papers discussed earlier uses that information in the models esti-
mated. Similarly, while the public use sample of the census provides a large enough 
sample to explore differences among ethnic groups in wage outcomes, the research 
cited earlier largely fails to exploit that possibility. Furthermore, while papers using 
the census do include community size variables they exclude Atlantic Canada. The 
public use sample of the census withholds visible minority identifiers for Atlantic 
Canada for confidentiality reasons. This means that the estimates of disadvantage in 
those studies are biased upwards because a good sized native-born population with 
generally low wages is excluded from their data. There is no reason to think that the 
inflation of the estimate of the magnitude of disadvantage caused by the absence of 
Atlantic Canada in research that uses the census precisely offsets the reduction in 
the estimate caused by the absence of a measure of community size in our research. 
We would simply underline the fact that there are difficulties with the estimates from 
existing research.
Conclusion
The fact remains that our results indicate that visible minority immigrant men earn 
less than whites after controls for human capital. This disadvantage rests, substan-
tially, on the depreciation of education completed overseas. Many visible minority 
immigrants are channelled into jobs that are less likely to match their level of certifi-
cation than is the case for the other two IVOI categories. This disadvantage could be 
construed as discrimination.
The issue, however, is not straightforward. Consider these perceptive remarks 
by Reitz (2001:372–373) on the issue of the evaluation of overseas educational cre-
dentials.
Foreign applicants to Canadian graduate programs present undergraduate credentials 
from around the world. The capacity of these Canadian graduate programs to evaluate 
many of the degrees from Asian, African, and Latin American universities is actually 
quite poor. Few within Canadian universities know more than a few of these foreign 
universities well, and programs are forced to rely on ratings systems which are quite 
crude. . . . If universities who specialize in credentials have problems, it is not hard to 
imagine that employers would also have problems. Universities might be justified in 
being credential-conservative — tending toward negative decisions in the absence of 
definite knowledge, in order to protect academic standards. But the consequences of a 
wrong decision are not great. After all, university programs with foreign applicants are 
considering students essentially as customers, not as employees. It is employers who 
have more to lose from hiring a foreign worker who turns out to be unproductive.
Reitz’s point is that the problems in evaluating credentials confronted by uni-
versity teachers are equally confronted by private sector employers, for whom the 
costs of a recruitment error are, he plausibly argues, probably higher. All this is to 
say that the assignment to discrimination of the place of education effect may have Measuring and Mismeasuring Discrimination against Visible Minority Immigrants
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been unsatisfactorily facile.
For some employers hiring errors imply high costs — particularly where the 
employer invests substantially in training (Barron, Berger, and Black (1997:186). 
Given this, employers offering higher-paying jobs — jobs that are more likely to 
involve training — are likely to act cautiously where they are uncertain of the value 
of a credential — say, a high school diploma from a third world country. They may 
require evidence of satisfactory previous work performance in jobs offering lower 
pay and/or may hire into effectively probationary job statuses of varying durations. 
Language skills — beyond the census-elicited information on whether the respond-
ent can hold a conversation in an official language — are likely to matter in most 
well-paid jobs. If the much discussed “knowledge economy” means anything it is 
surely that (Rubenson and Schuetze, 2000; Stehr, 2002).13 We do, as a matter of fact, 
have good evidence that employers are good at screening job candidates whose cog-
nitive skills, including language mastery, do not match their certification (Pryor and 
Schaffer, 1997; Boothby, 1999:37–40). This screening process might be expected 
to be of particular relevance in the hiring of someone with a difficult-to-interpret 
educational diploma.
All this being said, we certainly do not claim that the evidence assembled here 
demonstrates the absence of discrimination. Nor do our results contradict those that 
demonstrate a decline in the labour market performance of recent as compared to 
previous immigrants. In fact, falling returns to experience appear to provide a sub-
stantial part of the explanation for that relative decline (e.g., Picot and Sweetman, 
2005:22). Our exploration of the effect of visible minority immigrant experience on 
earnings complements this finding. More generally, while not suggesting that dis-
crimination does not exist our results do raise some questions about the magnitude of 
discrimination that has been inferred from previous studies.
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13.  In comparing the employment outcomes of current immigrants with previous ones the requirements 
of the knowledge economy are a major consideration. Earlier waves of immigrants came to a Canada 
that provided large numbers of jobs in manufacturing and mining — jobs that required only modest 
English or French literacy. In fact, the trade skills they had acquired in their countries of origin were 
often highly valued on the Canadian labour market, which did not provide comparable trades training 
(e.g., Meltz, 1982:7). The share of jobs in manufacturing and mining has since fallen dramatically, to 
be replaced by jobs in the service sector that do require language skills. Recent waves of immigrants, 
who are disproportionately members of visible minorities, may have official language skills equal 
to those of the Ukrainians, Greeks, Italians, Portuguese, and others who preceded them. But in the 
largely white-collar “knowledge economy” the absence of those skills matters much more.Yoko Yoshida and Michael R. Smith
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Appendix: Description of Variables*
Male Full-time Full-year workers Male all workers
Variable
Description/  
categories
Native-
born 
white
Immigrant 
white
Immigrant 
visible 
minority
Native-
born 
white 
Immi-
grant 
white
Immigrant 
visible 
minority
Education
Less than high school 12.65% 9.17% 10.91% 13.94% 9.43% 10.53%
High school (ref) 21.75% 16.21% 14.74% 20.84% 16.87% 14.91%
Some postsecondary 47.97% 49.11% 36.98% 47.71% 46.28% 39.37%
University or above 17.64% 25.51% 37.37% 17.51% 27.42% 35.19%
Language
Different at work and 
at home 4.46% 29.42% 45.81% 95.40% 72.53% 54.16%
Same at work and at 
home 95.54% 70.58% 54.19% 4.60% 27.47% 45.84%
OJT
No on-the-job training 
received 70.86% 77.18% 73.82% 71.36% 77.28% 74.06%
On-the-job training 
received 29.14% 22.82% 26.18% 28.64% 22.72% 25.94%
Classroom 
training
None 60.34% 64.40% 67.53% 62.87% 65.67% 69.66%
Some 39.66% 35.60% 32.47% 37.13% 34.33% 30.34%
Number of courses 0.97 0.76 0.75 0.89 0.72 0.68
Place of 
educa-
tion**
In Canada (ref) 100% 36.26% 12.30% 100% 37.63% 14.89%
Mixed 0 28.39% 38.64% 0% 28.52% 36.62%
Outside of Canada 0 35.34% 49.06% 0% 33.85% 48.49%
Industry***
Forestry, mining, oil, 
and gas extraction
10.15% 6.23% 5.31% 10.04% 5.80% 5.38%
Primary product 
manufacturing
Labour intensive ter-
tiary manufacturing 5.53% 7.87% 9.60% 5.02% 6.97% 8.42%
Secondary product 
manufacturing 5.18% 6.26% 5.74% 4.62% 5.95% 5.21%
Capital intensive ter-
tiary manufacturing 8.68% 13.08% 9.39% 7.85% 11.81% 9.31%
Construction 6.29% 7.40% 1.14% 6.67% 7.98% 1.37%
Transportation, ware-
housing, wholesale 16.31% 12.61% 11.27% 15.13% 11.79% 10.10%
Communication and 
other utilities 3.66% 1.87% 1.53% 3.18% 1.62% 1.89%
Retail trade and con-
sumer services (ref) 17.37% 11.08% 23.77% 19.33% 12.43% 26.63%
Finance and insurance 2.86% 3.16% 6.61% 2.61% 2.86% 5.65%
Real estate, rental and 
leasing operations 1.57% 1.80% 2.11% 1.78% 1.59% 2.05%
Business services 8.62% 14.16% 15.43% 8.18% 14.60% 14.93%
Education and health 
services 9.81% 10.01% 6.61% 11.91% 12.29% 7.61%
Information and cul-
tural industries 3.97% 4.48% 1.50% 3.69% 4.32% 1.45%
Number 
employees
<20 (ref) 28.11% 28.45% 30.78% 28.65% 27.74% 33.92%
20 to 99  30.65% 25.74% 30.70% 31.29% 27.13% 28.83%
100-499 20.28% 23.62% 24.46% 19.34% 22.27% 23.53%Male Full-time Full-year workers Male all workers
Variable
Description/  
categories
Native-
born 
white
Immigrant 
white
Immigrant 
visible 
minority
Native-
born 
white 
Immi-
grant 
white
Immigrant 
visible 
minority
Marital 
status
Single never married 
(ref) 18.61% 11.37% 20.44% 21.46% 13.23% 22.48%
Legally married 60.33% 74.42% 72.69% 57.63% 71.78% 70.51%
Commonlaw 14.48% 7.54% 1.79% 14.51% 8.43% 2.67%
Separated/divorced/
widowed 6.58% 6.67% 5.08% 6.40% 6.57% 4.33%
Occupa-
tion
Managers 22.10% 23.32% 20.52% 19.33% 21.61% 18.52%
Professionals 12.07% 17.18% 19.32% 12.63% 18.87% 19.19%
Technical/trades 50.22% 44.02% 39.19% 50.28% 43.10% 39.81%
Marketing/Sales 1.78% 4.17% 5.54% 2.78% 5.35% 6.27%
Clerical/Administrative 6.81% 2.86% 9.41% 6.52% 2.85% 9.34%
Foreign 
ownership
Foreign assets <=50% 89.12% 88.85% 89.63% 90.14% 89.55% 89.95%
Foreign assets >50% 10.88% 11.15% 10.37% 9.86% 10.45% 10.05%
Incentive 
pay
Not present 54.56% 49.49% 47.85% 58.03% 50.37% 49.48%
Present 45.44% 50.51% 52.15% 41.97% 49.63% 50.52%
Training 
expenses $ per employee 373.48 272.96 204.26 346.29 262.12 200.93
Collective 
bargaining
No collective  
agreement 70.23% 75.12% 83.71% 69.38% 73.81% 83.09%
Collective agreement 29.77% 24.88% 16.29% 30.62% 26.19% 16.91%
*’Ref’ is reference category in polytomous dummy variable analysis.
**Place of education based on age at immigration: ‘In Canada’ if less than 15; ‘Mixed’ if between 13 and 24; ‘Outside Canada” if 
over 25
***Forestry, mining, oil and gas extraction and Primary product manufacturing combined due to data release restrictions
Appendix (cont.)